| Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability JC Ely, M Peski Theoretical Economics 1 (1), 2006 | 140 | 2006 |
| Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics M Peski Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 216-248, 2010 | 98 | 2010 |
| Spontaneous discrimination M Pęski, B Szentes American Economic Review 103 (6), 2412-36, 2013 | 66 | 2013 |
| Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games M Pęski Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2), 732-735, 2008 | 57 | 2008 |
| Critical types JC Ely, M Pęski The Review of Economic Studies 78 (3), 907-937, 2011 | 46 | 2011 |
| Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting M Peski | 38 | 2012 |
| Repeated games with incomplete information on one side M Peski Theoretical Economics 3 (1), 29-84, 2008 | 32 | 2008 |
| Generalization of a result on "Regressions, short and long" F Molinari, M Peski Econometric Theory 22, 159-163, 2006 | 24 | 2006 |
| The principal-agent approach to testing experts W Olszewski, M Pęski American economic Journal: microeconomics 3 (2), 89-113, 2011 | 22 | 2011 |
| A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes M Pęski, T Wiseman Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 131-173, 2015 | 19 | 2015 |
| Value of persistent information M Pęski, J Toikka Econometrica 85 (6), 1921-1948, 2017 | 16 | 2017 |
| Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization M Pȩski Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 111-140, 2011 | 16 | 2011 |
| Prior symmetry, categorization and similarity-based reasoning M Peski Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 2011 | 15* | 2011 |
| Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility M Pęski Journal of Economic Theory 168, 432-471, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |
| Value‐based distance between information structures F Gensbittel, M Pęski, J Renault Theoretical Economics 17 (3), 1225-1267, 2022 | 8* | 2022 |
| Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games with gradual state changes M Pęski, T Wiseman Working paper, 2014 | 4 | 2014 |
| An anti‐folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring M Pęski Theoretical Economics 7 (1), 25-55, 2012 | 4 | 2012 |
| Bargaining with mechanisms M Pȩski American Economic Review 112 (6), 2044-2082, 2022 | 3* | 2022 |
| Tractable model of dynamic many-to-many matching M Pęski American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (2), 1-43, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Stationary social learning in a changing environment R Lévy, M Pęski, N Vieille arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.02122, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
Thomas WisemanEconomics, University of TexasVerified email at austin.utexas.edu
