| Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022 | 46 | 2022 |
| Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 23), 2022 | 28 | 2022 |
| Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, A Sgouritsa, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022 | 25 | 2022 |
| Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (AAAI 2021), 2020 | 22 | 2020 |
| Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions E Balkanski, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan 33rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2021 | 19 | 2021 |
| Online mechanism design with predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan, C Zhu arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.02879, 2023 | 12 | 2023 |
| Optimal metric distortion with predictions B Berger, M Feldman, V Gkatzelis, X Tan arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.07495, 2023 | 6 | 2023 |
| EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare M Garbea, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2023), 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
| Mechanism design with predictions: An annotated reading list E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan ACM SIGecom Exchanges 21 (1), 54-57, 2024 | 3 | 2024 |
| Clock auctions augmented with unreliable advice V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan Proceedings of the 2025 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2025 | 2 | 2025 |
| Learning-augmented metric distortion via (p, q)-veto core B Berger, M Feldman, V Gkatzelis, X Tan Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 984-984, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Extracting Small Subgraphs in Road Networks S Ahmadian, S Gollapudi, G Hutchins, K Kollias, X Tan Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, 493-502, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan, P Verma 33rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2024), 2023 | | 2023 |
| Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions G Aggarwal, A Gupta, X Tan, M Zhao THE WEB CONFERENCE 2025, 0 | | |
Vasilis GkatzelisDrexel University, Computer ScienceVerified email at drexel.edu
