| Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items R Cole, V Gkatzelis SIAM Journal on Computing 47 (3), 1211-1236, 2018 | 194 | 2018 |
| Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare R Cole, NR Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, ... Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017 | 184 | 2017 |
| Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 251-268, 2013 | 115 | 2013 |
| Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games R Cole, JR Correa, V Gkatzelis, V Mirrokni, N Olver Games and Economic Behavior 92, 306-326, 2015 | 100* | 2015 |
| Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, T Roughgarden Operations Research, 2016 | 82* | 2016 |
| Pricing private data V Gkatzelis, C Aperjis, BA Huberman Electronic Markets, 1-15, 2015 | 82 | 2015 |
| Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints K Yang, V Gkatzelis, J Stoyanovich Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019 | 75 | 2019 |
| Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture V Gkatzelis, D Halpern, N Shah 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2020 | 67 | 2020 |
| Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents S Brânzei, V Gkatzelis, R Mehta Operations Research, 2021 | 66* | 2021 |
| The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions P Dütting, V Gkatzelis, T Roughgarden Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (4), 897-914, 2017 | 56 | 2017 |
| Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, A Gorokh, B Jin Proceedings of the 33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2022 | 54 | 2022 |
| Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022 | 34 | 2022 |
| Positive results for mechanism design without money R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and …, 2013 | 27 | 2013 |
| Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service V Gkatzelis, E Markakis, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017 | 24 | 2017 |
| Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling I Caragiannis, V Gkatzelis, C Vinci Proceedings of the thirteenth conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2017 | 23 | 2017 |
| The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games D Fotakis, V Gkatzelis, AC Kaporis, PG Spirakis Theory of Computing Systems 50 (3), 559-578, 2012 | 22 | 2012 |
| Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023), 2023 | 20 | 2023 |
| A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020 | 20 | 2020 |
| Fair and efficient memory sharing: Confronting free riders EJ Friedman, V Gkatzelis, CA Psomas, S Shenker Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 1965-1972, 2019 | 19 | 2019 |
| Optimal data acquisition with privacy-aware agents R Cummings, H Elzayn, E Pountourakis, V Gkatzelis, J Ziani 2023 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML), 210-224, 2023 | 18 | 2023 |
Richard ColeProfessor of Computer Science, Courant Institute, New York UniversityVerified email at cs.nyu.edu
